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4 march 1994

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However, the government may believe this more often than it is true. Thus, it is sometimes surprised at the shock that an inadvertent revelation of the true policy arouses: and suspects that this is hypocritical on the part of commentators and the public, who are simply trying to deny that they really or that they would have approved the policy if they could have done so without sharing responsibility and blame for it. (See public reaction, and government's interpretation of it, when Ike admitted lying over U-2; when Arthur Sylvester claimed the government had a right to lie, after the Cuban Missile Crisis; when LBJ lied about escalation in VN, probably believing that some of those who could be expected to criticise him if the truth leaked out, would also have criticised him if he had acted differently and "bugged out" (specifically, RFK).

On other occasions, it is enough to fear that a small, vocal

part of the public would protest loudly if the truth were revealed, even though the mass of the public would approve, to motivate secrecy and lying. I.e., the aim may be to avoid controversy and commotion--or perhaps an extended public discussion, after an initial minority protest had attracted public attention to the subject--even though the state believes the policy has at least secret majority support (Nixon's "silent majority").

The fear may be specifically of a **hypocritical**, blame-avoiding, self-defensive, or opportunistic attack by certain rivals or leadership elements or commentators, if certain practices were revealed: even if it could be expected that those same people would have done the same thing themselves, or would have approved it if they had learned about it in circumstances that would not have opened them to any charges of complicity or sharing of values or responsibility. Also, these people might be suspected of knowing that these practices were ubiquitous among governments and nations and parties, and know the "good reasons" for them or at least the accepted tradition, but could be expected to conceal, be silent about, or deny this knowledge (Nixon and Watergate).

These fears are often realistic; though in a particular case the officials may underrate the potential for genuine surprise and shock. They may overrate the degree to which these practices really do have genuine precedents or their frequency; even more likely, they may overrate public and even elite knowledge of the phenomenon. E.g. governmental lying (before the Pentagon Papers and Watergate; White House criminality (till well after Watergate); Congressional abuse of privileges and abuse of campaign funds (see reaction to the House banking "scandal"); politicians' promiscuity.

Thus, officials lie so often, and so successfully, that they may suspect that the public really knows this, and that their silence means consent. Likewise for other practices.

Blame-avoidance is so ingrained in bureaucratic behavior that intelligence analysts, trying to understand or explain unforeseen or threatening behavior by a foreign country in a "crisis," find it very hard to acknowledge (perhaps even to themselves) the preceding acts or pattern of behavior by their own government that might have "provoked" or rationalised or legitimised the other state's behavior in response. (See the lack of discussion of Mongoose in the published records of the ExCom in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Or of US arms buildup policies, in predicting or explaining Soviet arms race decisions. Or acknowledgement to Congress of 34a at the time of the Tonkin Gulf "attacks".)

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is both inept and a loser, as well as a liar: and perhaps, depending on the substance of the revelations, a criminal, murderer, aggressor, etc.)

Declaratory policy, or myths:

--That all government officials, in all administrations, agree that all proliferation is bad, against the interests of the US or of world stability.

--That the government believes that the mass of the public believes that all or most governmental lying is illegitimate; and that the government officials agree with this (supposed) judgement. (High government officials, and their assistants, believe the opposite on both counts).

On the legitimacy of proliferation:

If there are to be considered to be "rogue" states, then the greatest rogue, beyond comparison, has been the US, followed closely by the SU, followed by the UK and France. This applies both to their violation of their obligations under various arms control treaties, and to their predominant influence on proliferation, in the past and in the present.

Why should not Japan, or others, acquire nuclear weapons? Given the example of the nuclear states, and the obvious high status-value and instrumental (diplomatic) value these states continue to assign (as shown by their concern over the FSU states, North Korea, Iraq, etc.; and by their refusal to restrict their own freedom of action or arsenals).

The main reason is the precedent this would set and influence on still further proliferation and use. But this applied to each of the earlier nuclear states: it was neither raised with them, before or after their decision, nor did it much influence their own consideration of their own interests. Why should Japan, or any potential proliferator, be different, or be held to a higher standard?

There is always the nth-country problem, or the 100th Monkey, the possibility of "tipping"; but again, this always applied in the past, and no other state set an example of considering it (i.e., none of the nuclear states; if anyone has, it has been, up till now, states like Japan and others that had the clear capability).

So the question is: why should Japan, or various other states--refrain from acquiring the modest benefits of having nuclear weapons so long as the present nuclear states persist in enjoying these, and in ignoring their international "obligations"?

certainly the US is the last country entitled to reproach any

other state on these issues; but is any other state very much entitled? (Unless New Zealand!)

It is in context of these considerations that one should approach the questions: What decisions has Japan actually made, and is it likely to make? There is no basis for singling out Japan as a potential "offender" or its potential actions as peculiarly dangerous, while ignoring--even briefly and provisionally--the preeminent importance of the past and present policies of the US and the other nuclear states. (See Endo on the need for even the lesser nuclear states to make at least symbolic reductions, in view of their obligations under the NPT: rarely considered by them or by Americans).

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Unless the nuclear states renounce the privileges of nuclear status and accept the same restraints they demand of others, the nuclear club will expand rapidly.

[This can take the form both of undeclared nuclear states making their possession of nuclear weapons public, weaponizing and increasing their forces (perhaps going on alert, and launching regional nuclear arms races, and making more or less explicit threats in crises; perhaps also, testing and acquiring TN weapons) and of presently non-nuclear states setting out to acquire nuclear capability--by production or by purchase or "theft"--which would either remain unacknowledged for the time being or be declared.

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The upcoming conference on the renewal of the NPT is the best chance in a long time for the non-nuclear states and for NGOs to bring pressure to bear on the nuclear states to change their policies. The implicit threat of denying the US an indefinite or 25-year extension in 1994 (less a threat of proliferation than a threat of political embarrassment) is relatively strong leverage this year for long-overdue reforms to be achieved **this year**.

But as of now, the Clinton Administration is heading for a fiasco in 1995, in one of two forms: one of them less embarrassing to Clinton but far more serious in the longer run.

The first form of fiasco--likely, or not unlikely, if there is not a signed agreement in principle on a CTB by the end of this

year--is that the conference, in effect, will be postponed for a year or two, or until the nuclear states have agreed on a CTB. That would be a highly embarrassing failure for Clinton (unless it could unmistakably be ascribed to obstinacy of some other state), though it would not be at all the worst possible intermediate outcome from the point of view of nonproliferation; it would put maximum publicity and pressure to bear on the nuclear states, not only to achieve a CTB but to produce other measures of self-restraint.

The more serious fiasco would be for the Administration to achieve its formal aims--an indefinite or 25-year extension of the treaty--with signers who had their fingers crossed behind their backs: many of whom intended to keep their part of the bargain no more substantively than the nuclear states--both superpowers and the others--have kept their part over the last quarter-century.

Such states may or may not imitate the behavior of Iraq and North Korea. They may surreptitiously follow the new route likely to open up: buying fissile materials, expertise, components or assembled weapons (and crews to operate them) from the FSU (or perhaps eventually, from North Korea, China or others).

Or there may be a way to flaunt the spirit of the Treaty without violating its letter. That is to follow Japan's path (but with the intention to have weapons or a weapons option, which Japan's leaders strongly deny and may or may not have). Reprocessing; breeders; and reactor-grade plutonium stockpile, or even weapons-grade plutonium "for the breeders" (production of which does not violate the NPT). (Or HEU "for research and naval reactors"). They could then, when "appropriate," either divert the fissile material to weapons use covertly, or resign from the NPT like North Korea and produce weapons either covertly or overtly.

In any of these cases, formal adherence to the NPT would fail to be accompanied either by a formal strengthening of the NP regime, in terms of inspections and sanctions and implementation of export controls (and widened or universal membership, perhaps required by the UN, submitting to these processes), or by an effective global ban on separating or stockpiling fissile materials, or by real intent to obey the requirements of the NPT and to demand, on pain of sanctions, that other states obey their commitments.

To avoid this second fiasco (which could come either next year, or later, following the first fiasco), a signed agreement on a CTB, followed shortly by ratification of a complete CTB (including verification provisions), is absolutely necessary. But it is not sufficient. Real progress, indeed, commitments, must be made on all the provisions of the MP-II/CNPT agenda.

In short: the nuclear states must stop using their nuclear weapons: either in diplomacy, or war, or as status symbols, reflecting their freedom of action and threat-capability (aspects

of "dignity" and enhanced sovereignty, independence, and importance) compared to non-nuclear states.

If they can't or don't choose to bring this about this year--or, if they are "given a year's grace" at the spring '95 conference, during the next year--then there will be no convincing reason to expect them to do it later, and proliferation will proceed, at least covertly, untrammelled.

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24 May 1994

Raskin, Dismantling the National Security State
State of the Union, 1994

nsc-68: '...the US had an empire to protect abroad, known commonly as "the free world"....[the national security state] would maintain control over the secrets of the state...insisting, moreover, to loyalty to the cult of secrecy." 80

I was disloyal, not so much, or only, to individuals, party, administration, but to the cult of secrecy: a heretic, to this cultic religion, which I "betrayed."

Will Mort's role in "democratization" be to give real substance to our former pretensions, our fig leaf for interventions covert and overt, our vicious hoax?
Consider instituting glasnost to close out Cold War: tell the truth, expose internal studies and histories and documents about:

- our relations with Iran (the Carter study!)
- our relations with Central America: Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador...
- secret war against Cuba (the real background of Cuba II!)
- the destruction of democracy in Chile
- relations with coups and dirty wars in Argentina and Brazil
- Sell the files of the CIA: like the KGB's.
- Bring FRUS series quickly up to end of Cold War!
- Nuclear crises and threats

[Compaq]

c:\auto\JTM
25 July 1988

ITEM: One day in the spring of 1964--it must have been about April 4--I was standing in the passageway in the offices of International Security Affairs where the xerox machine was located when the Assistant Secretary, John T. McNaughton, came over to the machine with a batch of cables in his hand to copy one himself. I recognized the subject of the cables he was holding; they were dispatches from Brazil, mainly from Lincoln Gordon, US Ambassador to Brazil, dealing with a coup then underway.

I had not yet joined McNaughton as his Special Assistant, but I spent a good deal of time that year in ISA, kibitzing mainly on nuclear policy. My best friend and close colleague, Harry Rowen, was McNaughton's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans and Policy, and at his invitation I regularly read the documents lying on his desk when I was in the office, so that I would know what was concerning him and could make useful comments. Latin America was far from my area of knowledge and concern, but it happened that I had read this particular file of cables that morning on Harry's desk.

Even though background to this day's "take" was lacking, it was clear from these dispatches that Gordon had had foreknowledge, at least, of the coup and that his knowledge of the ongoing takeover was detailed and intimate. It was also clear that he favored the success of the coup, which was replacing an elected civilian leader, Goulart, who, I gathered, was considered "radical" and questionably "pro-American," with a military junta.

After he had copied a document, McNaughton paused before he returned to his office and waved the handful of cables at me, posing a question that took for granted I knew their subject and the events of the day. "Could it be," he said, in an unwontedly reflective tone (I remember very clearly the intonations of his voice at that moment), "that the foreign policy of the United States is nothing but counter-revolution?"

He waited for a comment from me, but I had none to give. I had never addressed such a question, or heard it raised. I had never heard or read the words "counter-revolution" inside the government, and was never to hear it again.

McNaughton walked over to the door of his office, with his handful of papers. He went on: "If I thought that...if I really believed that...I couldn't go on sitting where I am, in this office." He gestured with the papers, toward his desk. Then he shrugged, and went inside.

I was struck by the question, but I don't recall thinking any further about it at the time, or for a long time after. JTM never raised the subject again, and he continued to sit in that office till he died, in June of 1967. I helped him, as his assistant,

working almost entirely on Vietnam, from August of 1964 till July of 1965, when I went to Vietnam.

In retrospect, it would not be correct to say that what we did together was "nothing but" counterrevolution. But for the US Government, that would be a good first approximation. And for what he and I did with respect to Vietnam, it would be a lot closer than that.